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Abstract
Purpose - This paper investigates the impact of Australian CFOs as board insiders on
firm performance and earnings quality with reference to agency theory and theory of
friendly board.
Design/methodology/approach - The OLS, 2SLS and PSM regressions are performed
with various proxies for firm performance and accruals quality.
Findings - Firms with CFOs as board insiders experience significantly lower firm perfor-
mance and earnings quality. In firms with powerful CEOs, the negative impact of CFO
board membership on earnings quality is further magnified. Additionally, the negative
impact of CFO board membership on firm values and earnings quality is only present in
firms with bigger boards or firms with less outside directors. Our findings are consistent
with the agency perspective and in sharp contrast to the US market.
Originality/value - This is the first Australian study to examine the impact of CFO
board membership on firm performance and earnings quality. Our findings suggest that
the monitoring of executives is best done by a small or independent board and that the
insider board membership should be optimised.
Keywords: CFO Board Membership, Firm Performance, Earnings Quality, CEO Power,
Board Monitoring
JEL classification: G34, M41.
1 Introduction
In past decades, the role of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) has changed substantially. CFOs
now actively develop and define their firms’ overall strategies instead of simply overseeing
the financial aspects (Zorn 2004). A large number of public firms now position their CFOs
as board members with fiduciary director responsibilities. There is empirical evidence in the
US literature that CFOs’ influence on firms’ financial management can be stronger than that
of the CEOs (Jiang et al. 2010, Chava & Purnanandam 2010). The literature on corporate
board governance reveals that board composition, such as the representation of outside or
female directors on the board, can have a substantial effect on firm outcomes (Adams & Fer-
reira 2009). We continue with this line of research by investigating the impact of appointing
CFO as a board member on firm performance and earnings quality in Australia.
We study the relation between CFO board membership and firm outcomes within the Aus-
tralian setting for a number of reasons. Firstly, the significance of the CFO function in
Australian organisation has been crystallised after the enactment of legislation imposing a
statutory duty on CFOs. Section 295A of the Corporations Act requires both Chief Execu-
tive Officers (CEOs) and CFOs to attest to the truth and fairness of published reports.1 The
legislative elevation of CFOs to the same level of financial oversight responsibility expected
of CEOs enables the former to be treated as a unique and relatively homogeneous role within
the executive ranks. Secondly, given the increasing awareness of the significance of CFOs
after the collapse of high-profile corporations such as Enron in the US, HIH Insurance and
Harris Scarfe in Australia, it is important to assess whether a CFO who holds a seat on the
board of directors influence firm performance and earnings quality, both of which encompass
the CFOs’ areas of authority. Thirdly, although there are a number of studies in the US that
investigate the effect of CFO board membership on firm outcomes (Mobbs 2014, Bedard et al.
2014), it is important to see whether the US findings apply in Australia given the differences
in the two markets.2 For example, the proportion of CFOs who are board members is about
five times higher in Australia than the US. Our data show that approximately 42% of the
Australian boards have CFOs as board members, whereas this proportion for the US boards
is roughly 8% (Bedard et al. 2014). The higher percentage of CFO board members may be
subject to less scrutiny by stakeholders in Australia compared with their US counterparts.
1Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the equivalent legislation in the US about the legislative elevation
of CFOs.
2It is acknowledged that both countries have similarities, such as similar market structures and corporate
participants, and a regulatory framework that requires both CEOs and CFOs to certify firms’ financial reports.
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Clement & Tse (2005) show that the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts is reduced substantially
when they have to deal with a number of companies and industries. This indicates that
Australian CFOs are likely to create more insider power and could potentially have different
influence on firm outcomes compared with their US counterparts. In addition, the regula-
tory framework for earnings management in Australia generally follows a “principle-based”
approach and provides a lower level of scrutiny than that in the US (Wilson 2011).3 This
could potentially make it easier for Australian CFOs with board membership to use their
increased power to influence earnings management to benefit themselves at the expense of
their shareholders.
There are two contradicting views on the influence of CFOs as board members. Agency
theory argues that adding insiders to the board reduces its effectiveness, thus negatively af-
fecting corporate performance and financial reporting quality (Finkelstein 1992, Klein 2002).
In contrast, friendly board theory (Adams & Ferreira 2007) claims that insiders can con-
tribute to a board’s effectiveness by sharing better communication and collaboration. Under
this perspective, the appointment of the firm’s CFO on the board of directors may have a
positive effect on firm outcomes (Mobbs 2014, Bedard et al. 2014).
We investigate the effect of having CFOs as board insiders on firm performance and earnings
quality in connection with both theories using a sample of Australian exchange-listed firms
over the 2006-2010 period. Firm performance is controlled by return on assets (ROA), return
on equity (ROE) and firm annual stock return. There are two measures of earnings quality:
the absolute value of forward-looking discretionary accruals (DA) from the modified Jones
(1991) model, and the accrual estimator errors (AEE) developed by Dechow & Dichev (2002).
We find that companies with CFOs on the board have significantly lower firm performance
and earnings quality. Our findings are contrary to the US evidence (Mobbs 2014, Bedard
et al. 2014) and support the agency argument that CFO board membership contributes to
insider power on the board. We also find that the negative impact of CFO board membership
on earnings quality is further magnified in firms with powerful CEOs, suggesting powerful
CEOs may have pressured CFOs to bias earnings reports. Our results are robust to different
measures of firm performance and earnings quality, and to tests for endogeneity. We further
examine two plausible governance monitoring mechanisms through which CFO serving on
3For example, Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that all audit committees of exchange-listed
US firms consist of solely independent directors, and at least one member must have accounting or financial
expertise. There is, however, no equivalent legislation in Australia about this matter, and Australian firms
are merely advised to follow best practice guidelines issued by the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX).
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board can negatively affect firm performance and earnings quality. We find that the negative
impact of CFO board membership on firm values and earnings quality is only present in firms
with bigger boards or firms with less non-executive directors.
Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. This is the first Australian study
to investigate the effect of CFO board membership on firm performance and earnings quality
with reference to both agency and friendly board theories. We differentiate between CFOs
as board insiders and other board directors when examining the impact on firm outcomes.
Treating all of the directors on the board as a single group implies similarity, yet CFOs differ
from other corporate executives due to their specialised role and knowledge in the financial
reporting function. It is especially important since the legislative elevation of CFOs to the
same level of financial responsibilities as CEOs. Prior literature mainly concentrate on the
influence of CEOs on financial reporting quality (Jiang et al. 2010). There has been no re-
search in Australia to date on the fiduciary responsibilities of CFOs who are board members
and our study attempts to fill this gap. Our second contribution is to relate the literature of
CEO power to CFO fiduciary duties as CFOs need to report directly to CEOs (Mian 2001).
By incorporating proxies of CEO power, we find that powerful CEOs have pressured CFOs
to bias the earnings report. Our last contribution is to examine two underlying governance
monitoring channels (board size and board independence) through which the presence of
CFOs on board can negatively impact firm values and earnings quality. This negative asso-
ciation is disappeared in firms with smaller boards or firms with more outside directors. Our
results suggest that CFO board membership should be optimised as it is detrimental to firm
outcomes unless the board of directors is active in monitoring.
The rest of our study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature
and hypothesis development. In Section 3, data sample and research methodology are pre-
sented. The empirical results are discussed in Section 4, followed by a number of robustness
tests. Section 5 presents concluding remarks.
2 Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1 Background
The literature on board governance reveals that the composition of a firm’s board of directors
can influence firm performance and financial reporting quality (e.g. Wang & Oliver 2009, Be-
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dard et al. 2014). Liu et al. (2015) show a significant association between board independence
and firm value. Yermack (1996) documents that companies with smaller boards have higher
firm performance and more favourable financial ratios. Cheng (2008) finds board size is neg-
atively associated with stock returns, ROA and accounting accruals. Masulis et al. (2012)
show that firms with foreign independent directors (FIDs) on the board exhibit significantly
lower ROA. Bae et al. (2012) find that Asian firms with weaker corporate governance expe-
rienced a larger drop in their share values during the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
Prior literature on the effect of corporate governance on earnings management generally indi-
cate that the composition of the board can improve the estimation of accounting accruals by
senior managers. It is well-documented that the presence of independent outside directors on
the board reduces the use of discretionary accruals (Klein 2002, Peasnell et al. 2005, Cornett
et al. 2008). Firms with female directors on the board (Srinidhi et al. 2011) or firms whose
CFOs hold board seats (Bedard et al. 2014) exhibit higher accruals quality. Previous research
also shows that the structure of a firm’s audit committee can influence earnings quality. Klein
(2002) documents that the independence of the audit committee leads to lower magnitudes
of discretionary accruals. Badolato et al. (2014) argue that an active, well-functioning, and
well-structured audit committee may be able to prevent earnings management. In particular,
they show that audit committees with both financial expertise and high relative status are
associated with lower levels of earnings management, as measured by accounting irregulari-
ties and abnormal accruals.
2.2 CFO board membership
With the legislative elevation of CFOs to the same level of financial oversight responsibility
as CEOs, it is arguable that CFOs can significantly influence their firm performance and
earnings quality. Many studies show that CFOs play an active role in controlling abnormal
accruals. Geiger & North (2006) find that a firm’s discretionary accruals are reduced during
the appointment of a new CFO. Dichev et al. (2013) indicate that 99.4% of CFOs (in a sur-
vey of 169 CFOs) believe that at least some firms manage earnings. Dejong & Ling (2013)
demonstrate that CFOs tend to have a larger influence on abnormal accruals than CEOs after
controlling for firm policy decisions. Sun et al. (2017) find an association between inflated
earnings and CFO characteristics such as age, gender and educational backgrounds.
There is documented evidence in the literature that CFOs can have an important impact
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on firm performance. Girigori (2013) shows that CFO expertise can significantly affect firm
profitability. Wang et al. (2012) find that CFO purchases are followed by more positive fu-
ture earnings surprises than those made by CEOs, suggesting trades made by CFOs are more
informative about future stock returns than those made by CEOs. In summary, the literature
shows that CFOs could significantly influence earnings management and firm profitability.
This suggests that the appointment of CFOs on the board of directors may also affect firm
outcomes. CFO board membership can create more insider power on the board as the CFOs
can vote on many important corporate issues. This creates interdependency similar to that
created when the CEO chairs the board meeting (Bedard et al. 2014).
Agency theory argues that having board membership could provide executives with more
power and influence (Finkelstein 1992), thereby reducing the board’s independence in ex-
ercising its monitoring role. The literature shows that less board independence can have a
significantly negative effect on firm performance and earnings quality because the executive
(as a board insider) can align with the CEO against the shareholders’ best interests (Klein
2002). CFOs holding board seats could hence reduce the board’s effectiveness, which is detri-
mental to corporate performance and reporting quality.
In contrast, friendly board theory, which is advanced by Adams & Ferreira (2007), claims that
board’s advisory role is more effective when management shares more information. Several
studies find that firm performance improvements are associated with greater involvement of
insiders on the board. For example, Klein (1998) finds that insiders on the finance and in-
vestment committees are related to higher firm stock market returns. Similarly, Adams et al.
(2005) document that a lack of insiders on the board is associated with increased volatility of
firm performance. Board seats allow CFOs to share more relevant financial information with
other board members, which may strengthen the board’s advisory role. Under this perspec-
tive, CFOs holding board seats may improve companies’ overall performance and enhance
the quality of financial reporting.
There is evidence in the US literature that firm performance and financial reporting quality
are positively influenced by boards that include their CFOs. Bedard et al. (2014) document
that companies with CFOs who hold board seats exhibit higher earnings quality. Their result
implies that the CFOs in those firms perform their roles better than other CFOs. Mobbs
(2014) argues that CFOs are granted board seats for strategic purposes, and that firms with
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CFOs as board insiders are associated with improved operating performance. Their results
generally supports the theory of friendly board. However, Collins et al. (2018), guided by
managerial power theory and the theory of power and self-focus, find that firms with powerful
CFOs with short pay durations tend to experience lower level of earnings quality. To date,
there is no Australian evidence on the effect of CFO board membership on firm outcomes.
Given the conflicting results in the US literature, we propose the first non-directional hy-
pothesis regarding the impact of CFO board membership on firm performance and earnings
quality in the Australian setting as follows:
H1a: There is an association between CFO board membership and firm performance.
H1b: There is an association between CFO board membership and earnings quality.
Mian (2001) additionally shows that CEOs hold power over CFOs since CFOs need to report
to the CEOs for a diverse set of business activities as part of their fiduciary duties to the
shareholders and the board. CEO power can be used in pressuring the CFO to manipulate the
reporting system and overstate the performance (Friedman 2014). Our study further inves-
tigates whether the relationship of CFO board membership on firm performance or earnings
quality is impacted by CEO power. We state the second non-directional hypothesis regarding
the moderating impact of CEO power on the association between CFO board membership
and firm performance and earnings quality as follows:
H2a: The association of CFO board membership and firm performance is moderated by CEO
power.
H2b: The association of CFO board membership and earnings quality is moderated by CEO
power.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Research method
The following model is estimated to examine the association of CFO board membership with
firm performance (H1a), or with earnings quality (H1b):
FirmPerformance/EarningsQuality = γ0 + γ1(CFOBoard) + γk(CFOCharacteristics)
+ γm(CorporateGovernance) + γn(FinancialV ariables)
+ [Y earDummies] + [IndustryDummies] + ǫ
(1)
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To measure firm performance, we use both accounting and stock market returns: return
on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE), and firm’s lagged annualised average weekly
stock return (Stock return). We use two measures for the extent to which managers use
their flexibility with accruals to manage earnings. The first measure is the absolute value
of forward-looking discretionary accruals (DA) from the modified model of Jones (1991), de-
veloped by Dechow et al. (2003). A higher absolute value of discretionary accruals signifies
lower earnings quality.4. The second measure of earnings quality is based on the accrual
estimator errors (AEE) developed by Dechow & Dichev (2002). This measure maps accruals
with past, current and future operating cash flows, and is calculated as a standard devia-
tion over the last five years, where a higher standard deviation denotes lower earnings quality.
Our main variable of interest, CFO Board, is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm CFO is
on its board of directors. If the agency perspective is prevalent, more CFO participation on
the board might be detrimental to firm performance, thus the coefficient of the CFO Board
variable is expected to be significantly negative. Alternatively, as a member of the board,
the CFO can potentially leverage the knowledge and experience of other board members and
extract valuable strategic inputs to improve overall firm performance. Under the theory of
friendly board, the presence of the CFO on their firm board is positively associated with
firm performance. The coefficient of the CFO Board variable is consequently expected to
be significantly positive for all types of firm performance measures. The agency perspective
also suggests that CFOs with board membership might take advantage of the flexibility in
accruals to manipulate earnings and reduce financial reporting quality. As a result, a sig-
nificantly positive association is expected between CFO Board and all measures of earnings
quality (DA and AEE) under the agency approach. However, the theory of friendly board
contends that CFOs sitting on the board can better collaborate with other board members,
and consequently develop better plans and obtain more resources to address any identified
problems in the financial reporting process. Accordingly, the coefficient of the CFO Board
variable should be significantly negative for both DA and AEE measures under the theory of
friendly board.
To test for hypotheses H2a and H2b, we introduce proxies of CEO power and the interaction
4Besides accruals quality, a number of studies in the literature have used other proxies for financial reporting
quality such as disclosed internal control weaknesses or accounting restatements (Aier et al. 2005, Chan et al.
2008). It is, however, not possible to obtain data on disclosed internal control weaknesses or accounting
restatement in Australia. Therefore, our analysis focuses on accruals quality as a proxy for financial reporting
quality. Chan et al. (2008) find that firms reporting material internal control weaknesses are more likely to
have higher absolute discretionary accruals than other firms.
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variables between CEO power and CFO Board into equation (1).
FirmPerformance/EarningsQuality = α0 + α1(CFOBoard) + αi(CEOPower)
+ γj(CFOBoard ∗ CEOPower) + αk(CFOCharacteristics)+
+ αm(CorporateGovernance) + αn(FinancialV ariables)
+ [Y earDummies] + [IndustryDummies] + ǫ
(2)
Friedman (2014) lists a number of empirical proxies for CEO power including the presence
of CEO on the board and in particular board sub-committees. We use two proxies for CEO
power, namely, CEO Duality and CEO Nominating (a dummy variable if the CEO is also
the chairman of the board, and if the CEO is also a member of the nominating committee,
respectively). It is expected that a CEO who also acts as the chairman will be able to have
more influence over the board. Similarly, a CEO who also sits in the nominating committee
should be able to influence the selection of new directors who may feel compelled to act
in the interest of the CEO. To investigate the impact of CFO board membership on firm
performance and earnings quality in firms with powerful CEOs, we interact the CFO Board
variable with the CEO Duality and CEO Nominating.
The remaining independent variables in model (1) and (2) are from the literature and pro-
vide controls for CFO characteristics, corporate governance and firm financial characteristics
(Larcker et al. 2007, Srinidhi et al. 2011). Table 1 contains definitions of control variables.
For each dependent variable, we estimate two regressions as two independent variables, Board
Size and AC Size, are included alternatively due to the high degree of correlation between
these variables. In all regressions, we also control for industry and time fixed effects due
to the differences in firm performance and earnings quality across industries and over time.
Following Petersen (2009), we estimate the standard errors of the coefficients using clustered
standard errors in each regression, as this method better accounts for the dependence in a
panel data set.
[Insert Table 1]
3.2 Sample and descriptive statistics
Our sample is drawn from the All Ordinaries Index which consists of the largest companies
by market capitalization on the ASX. The period of our study is for the years 2006-20105
5Our sample starts from the year 2006 since corporate governance data in Australia is generally not available
until the early 2000s. Furthermore, most of the data on CFO board membership and CFO characteristics
(approximately two-thirds of the sample firms) cannot be extracted from electronic databases. The high
level of manual collection of the required data from company annual reports results in a five-year sample
period. In addition, our sample covers the period 2006-2010 which timely captures the impact of GFC on firm
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and information is obtained from the S&P Capital IQ database. Data on CFO board mem-
bership, CFO characteristics and corporate governance are originally sourced from the S&P
Capital IQ and SIRCA Corporate Governance databases. The companies’ annual reports are
manually checked to obtain the required information when it is not available on the electronic
databases. Firm financial information is extracted from the DatAnalysis database. Compa-
nies with joint CEOs or change in CEOs during any financial year are excluded from our
sample. The final sample contains 510 firm-year observations for firm performance analysis,
418 observations for DA analysis, and 334 observations for AEE analysis. The sample devi-
ation is summarised in Panel A of Table 2. Panel B of Table 2, which shows the breakdown
of firms with CFOs on the board classified by industry, indicates that 41.57% of the firms in
our sample include their CFOs as board members. The proportion of Australian firms that
include their CFOs on their boards is four to five times larger than that reported in the US.6
[Insert Table 2]
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables. It reveals significant differences be-
tween firms with and without CFOs on the board. CFOs who are board insiders have, on
average, higher stock ownership (0.33% versus 0.09%) and stay longer in their positions (6.24
versus 4.65 years). For firms with CFOs on their boards, the board is less independent and
larger, and the size of the audit committee is slightly smaller. With reference to firm finan-
cial characteristics, firms with CFO board memberships have been incorporated longer, have
more financial leverage, higher growth opportunity (M/B ratio) and lower levels of capital
expenditures to sales. Firms with their CFOs on the boards are also, on average, less likely
to incur a net loss (18.65% versus 30.76%) and tend to have a higher ratio of inventory and
receivables to total assets (0.26 versus 0.16). The volatility of ROA, of cash flows to total
assets and of sales to total assets are all higher among firms with CFOs on their boards than
their counterparts. The median figures of both (inverse) measures of earnings quality are
higher in firms with CFOs having board membership (0.10 versus 0.07 for the DA measure
and 0.074 versus 0.051 for the AEE measure), implying that earnings quality is lower in those
firms. Firms with CFOs as board insiders also have lower stock market returns with average
figures of 5.95% versus 13.27%. However, the difference between the two groups of firms is
not significant for the accounting performance (ROA and ROE), firm size, the proportion of
financial expertise on the audit committee, the proportion of CEOs being the chairman of
performance and earnings quality. There is no legislative change in relation to the importance of CFOs since
the Corporations Act 2001, it is confident that our results are applicable to the current environment.
6The percentage of CFO board membership in the US firms is between 7.9% for the 2004-2007 period
(Bedard et al. 2014) and 10% from 1997 to 2008 (Mobbs 2014).
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the board, and the proportion of CEOs being a member of the nominating committee.
[Insert Table 3]
4 Empirical results
4.1 Firm accounting and stock performance
Table 4 presents the results of the association between CFO board membership and firm
performance. Panel A of Table 4 reveals that the coefficient of the CFO Board variable is
significantly negative for ROA and ROE when the AC Size is used in the regression instead
of Board Size.7 Firms with CFO as board insiders have ROA (or ROE) 5% (or 6%) lower
than that of firms without CFO board membership. There is also a negative relationship
between CFO board membership and stock market performance at the 5% significance level.
Controlling for other factors, firms with CFO board memberships have around 11% lower
annual stock returns than those without. These results support our hypothesis H1a, and are
consistent with the univariate results presented in Table 3. They are, nevertheless, contrary
to the results in the US market (Mobbs 2014) where the presence of a CFO on the board
results in better firm operating performance. Our results instead provide support for agency
theory which indicates that CFOs on the board do not always act in shareholders’ best in-
terests, which can result in decreased firm performance.
[Insert Table 4]
In Panel B of Table 4, similar results are observed for CFO Board variable, but proxies for
CEO power (CEO Duality and CEO Nominating) are negative but not significant on all mea-
sures of performance. The interaction variables between CFO Board and two variables of
CEO power are, however, insignificantly positive. Our result does not support the hypothesis
H2a. It implies that the negative impact of CFO board membership on firm performance is
reduced in firms with powerful CEOs though the reduction is not statistically significant. For
example, the coefficients of CFO Board and CEO Nominating variables are -0.05 and -0.01 in
the regression of ROA (Column (1) of Panel B). Those coefficients in firms with CFO having
board membership and CEO sitting on the nominating committee becomes -0.02 (-0.05 +
0.03) and 0.02 (-0.01 + 0.03), respectively.
7The negative relationship between firm performance and the size of its board of directors is well-document
in the literature (Yermack 1996). Table 3 indicates that firms with CFOs on the board have significantly
bigger board size than firms without. To address this possible endogeneity issue, we perform the propensity
matching score (PSM) procedure which control for firm size, leverage, firm age, board size, industry and
year (see Section 4.3.5 for details). The regression results of PSM sample show that CFO Board variable is
significantly negative when including either AC Size or Board Size variable.
10
The results for our control variables are generally consistent with the literature. The coef-
ficient of the Board Size variable is significantly negative for both measures of accounting
performance and consistent with Yermack (1996)’s suggestion that firms with larger boards
perform worse than those with smaller boards. A positive relationship is found between the
audit committee size and firm stock market performance, suggesting that having more mem-
bers in the audit committee provides more effective monitoring, and improving firm stock
market performance. There is a negative association between leverage and ROA, implying
that the cost of bankruptcy in highly financial-levered firms may have a negative effect on
firm value (Horne 2002). The coefficient of the CAPEX/Sales variable is found to be sig-
nificantly negative for accounting performance measures, as capital expenditures reduce net
income and lead to lower firm value. Firms with higher growth opportunities (proxy by M/B
ratio) are found to have significantly higher stock performance. Mature firms (proxy by Firm
Age) are positively related to measures of accounting performance. We find firm size to be
positively associated with accounting performance, but negatively related to stock market
performance. Our finding of a negative relationship between firm size and the stock market
return is consistent with the well-known size effect, whereby smaller firms persistently, on
average, generate higher stock returns (Banz 1981).
4.2 Earnings quality
The results of analysing earnings quality are presented in Table 5. Panel A of Table 5 shows
significantly positive coefficients of CFO Board for both (inverse) measures of earnings quality
(DA and AEE). Our results provide support for the hypothesis H1b, implying that the quality
of earnings is lower for firms with CFOs serving on the board of directors than that for other
firms. They are consistent with the univariate tests in Table 3, but are in contrast to the
evidence presented in the US market by Bedard et al. (2014). Our findings again support the
agency perspective that CFOs with seats on the board could potentially use their increased
power to add more bias into the financial reporting process.
[Insert Table 5]
In Panel B of Table 5, proxies for CEO power (CEO Duality and CEO Nominating) are
positive but not significant on all measures of earnings quality. While the interaction vari-
able between CFO Board and CEO Duality are significantly positive for both measures of
earnings quality, the interaction between CFO Board and CEO Nominating is positive but
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only significant in the case of discretionary accruals. Our results support the hypothesis
H2b, suggesting that the positive relationship between CFO board membership and (inverse)
measures of earnings quality is further enhanced in firms with powerful CEOs. For instance,
the coefficients of CFO Board and CEO Duality variables are 0.04 and 0.01 in the regression
of AEE (Column (3) in Panel B). Those coefficients in firms with CFOs as board insiders
and CEOs as chairman of the board becomes 0.17 (0.04 + 0.13) and 0.14 (0.01 + 0.13),
respectively. Our findings support the argument of Friedman (2014) that CFOs are subject
to more pressure to bias earnings reports in firms with powerful CEOs.
Consistent with prior studies on earnings management (Dechow & Dichev 2002, Cornett
et al. 2008), firm size is significantly negative, indicating that larger firms are associated with
higher quality of earnings. This is probably due to the management in larger firms facing more
scrutiny from regulators, which may cause them to be less involved in managing accruals.
Board size is positively related to DA, signifying that firms with larger boards are associated
with greater use of earnings management. This is consistent with Yermack (1996)’s conclusion
that smaller boards are more effective monitors than larger boards. The negative relationship
between firm leverage and AEE indicates that companies with high financial leverage deliver
higher earnings quality. This is likely due to the degree of lender monitoring, and managers
in these firms, therefore, may be less likely to use income-increasing or income-decreasing ab-
normal accruals. Similar to Klein (2002), we find that DA is positively associated with M/B
ratio, indicating that growth companies are more likely to have higher discretionary accruals.
We also find a negative relationship between Firm Age and DA, implying that more mature
companies have better earnings quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). The coefficients of
Prop. Loss Years and Std dev(Sales/TA) variables are positive, suggesting that firms with
more years of reported net loss or firms with higher sales volatility experience lower quality
of earnings (Dechow & Dichev 2002).
4.3 Robustness tests
4.3.1 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) effect
We replace the fixed time effect in the regression models (1) and (2) by another variable,
During GFC (a binary variable to indicate if firms are in the crisis period (2008 or 2009)),
to control for the impact of GFC on firm performance and earnings quality. We re-run the
regression models (1) and (2) and find similar results to those reported in Table 4 and 5.
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4.3.2 Alternative measures of firm performance
We perform additional sensitivity tests using different measures of firm stock return: (i)
annual stock return; (ii) industry-adjusted stock returns which capture firms’ annual excess
returns on their GICS industry sectors.8 The new regressions yield coefficient estimates sim-
ilar to those shown in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4. Additionally, we re-run Table 4 with
dependent variables being ROAt+1, ROEt+1 and StockReturnt+1 since governance struc-
tures can be associated with firms’ future performance (Larcker et al. 2007). We find similar
results to those presented in Table 4.
4.3.3 Alternative measures of earnings quality
The DA variable is re-estimated with two alternative models: (i) the forward-looking Jones
model developed by Kothari et. al (2005); (ii) the margin model developed by Peasnell et al.
(2000). We find similar results to those reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, indicating
our results are robust with respect to alternative accruals models.
The AEE variable is originally calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals over the
last five years (Dechow & Dichev 2002). We change the calculation of the AEE variable to
the absolute value of the residuals (Ittonen et al. 2013). The different measure of AEE also
produces similar results to those presented in Column (3) and (4) of Table 5, with comparable
coefficient estimates in both sign and magnitude.
The proxy of accruals management is replaced by a variable that captures the effects of real
earnings management as firms can also manage earnings by altering their real activities (Roy-
chowdhury 2006). We following Duong & Evans (2015)’s method to compute a measure of
total effects of real earnings management (REM). The higher absolute value of REM, the
more likely that the firm is engaging in manipulations of real activities. Table 5 is replicated
with the absolute value of REM, instead of DA and AEE variables. We find similar results
to those presented in Table 5, suggesting that our results are robust to alternative measures
of earnings management.
8The data on the returns of 10 GICS industry sectors are obtained from the S&P/ASX 200 index.
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4.3.4 Two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression
We use a two-stage instrumental variable approach to address the potential endogeneity issue
among corporate governance structures which are developed through choice, for example, the
CFO board insider variable, and other firm characteristics. Our instrument variable, CFO
Tenure, satisfies the necessary conditions for being a valid instrument.9 We replicate the
regressions of Table 4 and Table 5 using the 2SLS procedure with CFO Tenure as the instru-
mental variable. Overall, the 2SLS regressions produce coefficient estimates of the same sign,
similar magnitudes and significance levels.
4.3.5 Propensity score matching (PSM) analysis
To address the endogeneity concern and potential selection bias of CFOs with board mem-
bership not being randomly assigned to firms, we use PSM procedure to match firms with
CFO board membership and firms without. In each year, we run a logit regression to model
the probability of a firm having CFO board membership with independent variables being
firm size, leverage, firm age and board size, controlling for industry effects. For each firm
with CFO having board seat, we choose a control firm with CFO not having board member-
ship by performing a one-to-one nearest neighbor match with replacement. The matching
procedure is based on the closest propensity score with a caliper width of 0.10. We pool
the treatment sample (firms with CFO board membership) and the matched sample10 (firms
without CFO board membership) together and re-estimate the regression models (1) and (2).
We find similar results to those reported in Table 4 and Table 5: the presence of CFO on
board negatively affect firm performance and earnings quality.
4.3.6 Governance monitoring mechanisms
We explore two governance mechanisms through which CFO serving on board can nega-
tively affect firm performance and earnings quality. As indicated in Section 2.1, board size
and board independence have significant influences on earnings management and firm value.
9There is a strong association between the CFO’s presence on the board and the experience with the CFO’s
own firm. Univariate tests (Table 3) show that CFO tenure is significantly higher for firms with their CFOs on
the board. The logistic regression of CFO board membership against a list of factors that can be associated
with the CFO’s presence on the board also confirms this finding. Furthermore, Bedard et al. (2014) show that
CFO tenure can be an appropriate instrumental variable when investigating earnings quality. In addition, the
post-estimation test for weak instruments (the Cragg-Donald Wald F test) found that our instrument, CFO
Tenure, is valid.
10Untabulated results show that there is insignificant difference between the treated firms and the matched
firms.
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Jensen (1993) contends that non-executive directors in bigger boards are less likely to function
effectively and it is easier for executives to influence the board’s decisions. Cheng (2008) in-
dicates that both coordination/communication problems and agency problems become more
severe as a board grows larger. We thus postulate that if smaller boards are better in moni-
toring executives, the negative impact of CFO board membership on firm value and earnings
quality is only apparent in firms with bigger boards. As such, we separate our original sample
into two subsamples: bigger boards (i.e. firms with board size being equal or greater than
the sample median11 of 8) and smaller boards (i.e. firms with board size less than the sample
median). We then replicate the regressions of Table 4 and Table 5 on those two subsamples
of board size.12 It is found that CFO Board variable is only significant in the bigger board
sample, implying that the negative effect of CFO board membership on firm values and earn-
ings quality is largely driven by larger boards which are less effective in monitoring.
Board independence is also considered as another important monitoring tool of internal gov-
ernance mechanisms as independent directors limit insider self-dealing and improve efficiency.
Peasnell et al. (2005) suggest that outside directors contribute towards the integrity of finan-
cial statements while Liu et al. (2015) find board independence increases firm performance.
We argue that if board independence is an effective monitoring mechanism, the negative in-
fluence of CFOs as board insiders is only visible in firms with less independent boards. We
hence divide our original sample into 2 subsamples: less independent boards (i.e. firms with
proportion of executive directors on board (Insider Ratio) being equal or greater than the
sample median of 0.375) and more independent boards (i.e. firms with Insider Ratio less
than the sample median), and re-estimate the regressions of Table 4 and Table 5 on those
two subsamples. The coefficient estimates of CFO Board are found only significant in the
“less independent board” sample, whereas they are insignificant in the “more independent
board” sample. This evidence suggests that the negative impact of CFO board membership
on firm performance and earnings quality is disappeared in firms with board independence
which are more actively engaged in monitoring.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether CFOs who become board members with fiduciary director
responsibilities influence firm performance and earnings quality, with reference to the agency
11Jensen (1993) also indicates that board is big when contains more than 7 or 8 directors.
12Results will be available upon request.
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perspective and friendly board theory. Our work focuses on CFOs since there has been a
significant shift in their roles in the last two decades, from undertaking operational respon-
sibility to developing and instigating strategic changes.
We find that having the CFO on the board does not improve firm outcomes. Firms with
CFO board membership have significantly lower performance and earnings quality. More-
over, powerful CEOs tend to put more pressure on CFOs to bias earnings report. Firms
with powerful CEOs show further negative relationship between CFO board membership
and earnings quality. Our findings are consistent with the prediction of agency theory but
contrary to the US market, where CFO board members are more likely to lead to positive
firm outcomes, likely due to enhanced director communication. We further document that
the negative relationship between CFO board membership and firm performance (or earnings
quality) is driven by bigger boards or boards with less independent directors. Our results
have implications for boards to decide whether awarding board memberships to their CFOs
will enhance the firms’ monitoring effectiveness and outcomes.
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Table 1: Variable definitions.
Variables Definition
Firm accounting and stock performance
ROA Earnings before tax divided by total assets.
ROE Earnings before tax divided by book value of shareholders’ equity.
Stock return Firm annual stock return, calculated as the lagged annualised average weekly returns.
Earnings quality
Discretionary Accruals The absolute value of the difference between total accruals (measured as the
(DA) difference between firm earnings and operating cash flows, scaled by total assets
in previous year) and estimated forward-looking non-discretionary accruals from
the modified Jones model which was developed by Dechow et al. (2003).
Accrual Estimation The standard deviation of residuals (obtained from firm-specific regressions of
Errors (AEE) changes in working capital on past, present and future operating cash flows) over
the past 5 years. It is based on the model of Dechow & Dichev (2002).
Financial characteristics
Total Assets The book value of total assets in the prior year.
Leverage Total debt divided by the market value of equity. &
M/B Ratio The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.
Firm Age The number of years from the current year to the year of incorporation.
CAPEX/Sales Capital expenditures over sales.
INVREC Inventory plus receivables to total assets.
Prop. Loss Years The proportion of years that a firm made loss over the last 6 years.
Std dev (ROA) Standard deviation of ROA over the last five years.
Std dev (ROE) Standard deviation of ROE over the last five years.
Std dev (Stock return) Standard deviation of firm stock return over the past five years.
Std dev (Sales/TA) Standard deviation of sales scaled by total assets over the last 5 years
Std dev (CF/TA) Standard deviation of operating cash flows scaled by total assets over the last 5 years
Governance and CFO characteristics
CFO Board A binary variable coded as 1 if the CFO is on the board, 0 otherwise.
CFO Ownership The percentage of firm shares owned by the CFO.
CFO Tenure The number of years since the CFO was appointed.
CEO Duality A binary variable coded 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise
CEO Nominating A binary variable coded 1 if the CEO is also a member of the nominating committee,
0 otherwise
Board Size The number of directors on the board of directors.
Insider Ratio The percentage of executive directors on the board.
PAFE The proportion of audit committee members who are financial accounting experts,
i.e. the biography indicates at least one of the followings: CPA, CFO, auditor,
controller, treasurer, or finance manager.
AC Size The number of directors on the audit committee.
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Table 2: Nature of the sample.
Panel A: Sample deviation
Observations
Initial sample from the All Ordinaries Index (2006-2010) 2,330
Less:
Firms without CFO names (534)
Firms without information on CFO tenure, CFO ownership and corporate governance (1,195)
Firms without required financial information (46)
Firms with joint CEOs or change in CEOs during financial year (45)
Final sample - firm performance 510
Less:
Financial firms (82)
Firms without accounting data to calculate discretionary accruals (DA) (10)
Final sample - discretionary accruals (DA) 418
Less:
Firms without accounting data over the last 5 years to calculate
accruals estimation errors (AEE) (84)
Final sample - accruals estimation errors (AEE) 334
Panel B: Sample by industry (Firm performance sample)
Industry sector Number of Firms with Firms without Proportion of firms with
observations CFOs on Board CFOs on Board CFOs on Board
Consumer Discretionary 51 21 30 41.18%
Consumer Staples 33 16 17 48.48%
Energy 57 18 39 31.58%
Financials 79 23 56 29.11%
Healthcare 46 15 31 32.61%
Industrials 88 55 33 62.50%
Materials 123 57 66 46.34%
Information Technology 18 0 18 0%
Telecommunications 11 7 4 63.64%
Utilities 4 0 4 0%
Total 510 212 298 41.57%
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics.
Variables Pooled sample CFO on Board CFO not on Board (2)-(3)
Mean Mean Mean t-stat
(Median) (Median) (Median) (Mann-Whitney)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Firm accounting and stock performance
N = 510 N = 212 N = 298
Dependent Variables
ROA 3.39% 3.23% 3.46% -0.04
(6.58%) (5.64%) (6.75%) (1.59)
ROE 13.95% 12.68% 14.53% -1.29
(16.48%) (15.49%) (18.48%) (1.41)
Stock return 8.79% 5.95% 13.27% -2.11**
(9.98%) (6.87%) (11.92%) (2.13)**
Independent variables
CFO Board 41.57%
CFO Ownership 0.19% 0.33% 0.09% 4.97***
(0.03%) (0.06%) (0.02%) (3.78***)
CFO Tenure (years) 5.31 6.24 4.65 4.64***
(4.21) (5.38) (3.58) (5.25***)
CEO Duality 4.12% 3.30% 4.70% -0.78
CEO Nominating 20.59% 22.64% 19.13% 0.97
PAFE 55.07% 56.04% 55.46% 0.23
(60.57%) (66.67%) (55.00%) (0.46)
AC Size 3.46 3.37 3.52 -1.75*
(3.00) (3.00) (3.00) (1.15)
Board Size 7.75 8.33 7.34 4.41***
(8.00) (8.00) (7.00) (4.04)***
Insider Ratio 41.63% 44.80% 35.21% 7.46***
(40.00%) (43.65%) (33.33%) (7.20***)
Total Assetst−1 ($mil) 21,270 16,649 24,557 -1.02
(621) (885) (484) (1.37)
Leverage 0.46 0.50 0.43 3.11**
(0.47) (0.53) (0.44) (3.99***)
M/B Ratio 3.37 3.43 3.33 0.25
(2.29) (2.78) (2.11) (1.93*)
Firm Age (years) 49.31 61.26 46.26 3.57***
(41.00) (52.50) (25.00) (4.62***)
CAPEX/Sales 1.45 1.12 1.59 -0.83
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (2.05**)
Std dev (ROA) 10.66% 15.13% 7.47% 2.62***
(2.92%) (3.27%) (2.81%) (1.37)
Std dev (ROE) 13.56% 14.27% 12.49% 1.19
(7.43%) (8.62%) (6.81%) (1.61)
Std dev (Stock return) 53.97% 51.17% 56.24% -1.52
(42.62%) (42.01%) (44.15%) (1.63)
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Variables Pooled sample CFO on Board CFO not on Board (2)-(3)
Mean Mean Mean t-stat
(Median) (Median) (Median) (Mann-Whitney)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: Earnings quality
Dependent Variables
N = 418 N = 185 N = 233
DA 0.56 0.61 0.48 0.84
(0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (1.81*)
N = 334 N = 156 N = 178
AEE 0.096 0.099 0.095 0.46
(0.063) (0.074) (0.051) (1.86*)
Additional independent variables
N = 418 N = 185 N = 233
INVREC 0.20 0.26 0.16 6.04***
(0.15) (0.24) (0.12) (6.02)***
Prop. Loss Years 25.40% 18.65% 30.76% -3.32***
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (2.87***)
Std dev (Sales/TA) 24.91% 30.09% 20.79% 1.70*
(14.89%) (17.66%) (11.44%) (3.84***)
Std dev (CF/TA) 13.17% 18.56% 11.25% 3.09***
(5.21%) (5.78%) (4.02%) (1.78*)
This table presents the summary statistics, reported for the whole sample and also partitioned by CFO board
membership. Panel A has variables used to analyse firm performance. Panel B contains additional variables
for the analysis of earnings quality. All variables are defined in Table 1. Tests for difference in mean and
median of each variable in the two sub-samples are presented. Bold figures show a significant difference
between the two sub-samples with *, **, *** for the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Regression Results of Firm Accounting and Stock Performance.
Panel A: CFO board membership variable only
ROA ROE Stock return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CFO Board -0.05** -0.01 -0.06* -0.01 -0.11** -0.12**
[-1.97] [-0.55] [-1.68] [-0.32] [-1.98] [-2.05]
CFO Ownership -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07
[-1.06] [-0.97] [-0.88] [-0.72] [-1.54] [-1.63]
CFO Tenure (ln) 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.003 0.002
[1.36] [1.56] [1.19] [1.60] [0.10] [0.08]
PAFE 0.01 0.02 0.0003 0.01 0.11 0.08
[0.27] [0.50] [0.004] [0.15] [1.16] [0.90]
AC Size -0.01 -0.01 0.04*
[-0.87] [-0.56] [1.91]
Board Size -0.02** -0.03*** 0.01
[-2.28] [-2.75] [0.46]
Insider Ratio 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.09
[1.57] [0.79] [1.02] [0.04] [0.38] [0.42]
Total Assetst−1 (ln) 0.02* 0.03** 0.03** 0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04**
[1.83] [2.36] [2.74] [3.70] [-2.60] [-2.24]
Leverage -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.05** -0.04** -0.13*** -0.13***
[-8.91] [-9.56] [-2.55] [-2.48] [-5.31] [-5.27]
M/B Ratio 0.002 0.002 0.01 0.001 0.02*** 0.02***
[0.97] [1.23] [1.62] [0.79] [2.88] [2.97]
Firm Age (ln) 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04** 0.01* 0.04 0.04
[2.86] [2.90] [2.27] [1.76] [1.42] [1.38]
CAPEX/Sales -0.01* -0.01* -0.01** -0.01*** -0.001 -0.001
[-1.83] [-1.91] [-2.52] [-2.64] [-0.06] [-0.08]
Std dev(ROA) -0.01 -0.01
[-0.28] [-0.19]
Std dev(ROE) 0.03 0.03
[0.61] [0.60]
Std dev (Stock return) 0.05 0.05
[0.38] [0.34]
Adjusted R2 28.38% 30.82% 20.59% 22.40% 21.86% 20.55%
Total observations 510 510 510 510 510 510
continued on next page
24
continued from previous page
Panel B: With CEO power variables
ROA ROE Stock return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CFO Board -0.05** -0.02 -0.07* -0.02 -0.12** -0.13**
[-2.15] [-0.74] [-1.72] [-0.54] [-2.08] [-2.24]
CEO Duality -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.004 -0.01
[-0.42] [-0.40] [-0.45] [-0.44] [-0.03] [-0.05]
(CEO Duality)*(CFO Board) 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.25 0.13 0.12
[1.53] [1.57] [1.46] [1.49] [0.53] [0.49]
CEO Nominating -0.01 -0.003 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
[-0.33] [-0.11] [-0.44] [-0.15] [-0.40] [-0.29]
(CEO Nominating)*(CFO Board) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.11
[0.57] [0.61] [0.32] [0.27] [1.12] [1.01]
CFO Ownership -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07
[-0.88] [-0.75] [-0.78] [-0.59] [-1.60] [-1.58]
CFO Tenure (ln) 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.004 0.01
[1.63] [1.57] [1.14] [1.56] [0.14] [0.24]
PAFE -0.002 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.04
[-0.06] [0.31] [-0.65] [-0.41] [0.68] [0.41]
AC Size -0.01 -0.01 0.04*
[-1.08] [-0.47] [1.86]
Board Size -0.02*** -0.03*** 0.01
[-2.83] [-2.68] [0.72]
Insider Ratio 0.18 0.10 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.09
[1.50] [1.36] [1.05] [0.06] [0.41] [0.37]
Total Assetst−1 (ln) 0.02** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.026*** -0.04** -0.04*
[2.18] [2.90] [2.67] [3.48] [-1.96] [-1.87]
Leverage -0.08* -0.08* -0.03 -0.03 -0.28 -0.29
[-1.67] [-1.69] [-0.17] [-0.21] [-1.50] [-1.56]
M/B Ratio 0.002 0.002 0.01 0.02 0.02*** 0.02***
[0.73] [0.10] [1.63] [1.58] [3.00] [3.11]
Firm Age (ln) 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.05** 0.04** 0.05 0.05
[3.48] [3.37] [2.27] [2.09] [1.45] [1.43]
CAPEX/Sales -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 0.004 0.005
[-2.15] [-2.29] [-2.18] [-2.33] [0.56] [0.59]
Std dev(ROA) 0.02 0.02
[0.43] [0.54]
Std dev(ROE) 0.05 0.05
[1.33] [1.32]
Std dev (Stock return) 0.08 0.08
[0.51] [0.66]
Adjusted R2 17.94% 21.01% 21.90% 23.87% 22.95% 21.03%
Total observations 510 510 510 510 510 510
This table presents the regression results on firm performance. Panel A and B present the results for testing H1a and
H2a, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1. Figures in square brackets are t-statistics. Emboldened figures
indicate statistical significance with *, **, *** for the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Regression Results of Earnings Quality.
Panel A: CFO board membership variable only
Discretionary Accruals Accrual Estimation Errors
(DA) (AEE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CFO Board 0.16* 0.11* 0.03** 0.02*
[1.76] [1.66] [1.96] [1.70]
CFO Ownership -0.08 -0.09 0.02 0.02
[-1.21] [-1.49] [0.93] [0.83]
CFO Tenure (ln) 0.06 0.07 0.003 0.002
[1.04] [1.23] [0.41] [0.36]
PAFE -0.05 -0.12 0.03 0.02
[-0.41] [-1.15] [1.13] [0.85]
AC Size 0.07 0.01
[1.43] [1.13]
Board Size 0.04* 0.003
[1.94] [0.97]
Insider Ratio -0.31 -0.23 -0.03 -0.02
[-0.83] [-0.61] [-0.63] [-0.44]
Total Assetst−1 (ln) -0.02** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02***
[-2.55] [-2.74] [-4.12] [-3.71]
Leverage 0.03 -0.03 -0.05* -0.05*
[0.12] [-0.10] [-1.85] [-1.90]
M/B Ratio 0.02* 0.02* 0.0001 0.0001
[1.80] [1.87] [0.13] [0.24]
Firm Age (ln) -0.09** -0.10** 0.01 0.01
[-2.14] [-2.43] [0.76] [0.76]
INVREC 0.33 0.26 -0.05 -0.05
[1.20] [0.96] [-1.60] [-1.63]
Prop. Loss Years 0.28* 0.29* 0.07*** 0.06***
[1.85] [1.88] [2.96] [2.89]
Std dev(Sales/TA) 0.07 0.07 0.01** 0.01**
[0.66] [0.62] [2.17] [2.18]
Std dev(CF/TA) 0.21 0.22 -0.01 -0.01
[1.04] [1.03] [-0.40] [-0.39]
Adjusted R2 28.22% 28.37% 25.11% 25.23%
Total observations 418 418 334 334
continued on next page
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Panel B: With CEO power variables
Discretionary Accruals Accrual Estimation Errors
(DA) (AEE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CFO Board 0.17* 0.11* 0.04** 0.03**
[1.70] [1.66] [2.38] [2.08]
CEO Duality 0.28 0.28 0.01 0.01
[0.73] [0.71] [0.30] [0.34]
(CEO Duality)*(CFO Board) 1.67* 1.65* 0.13*** 0.13***
[1.87] [1.84] [2.73] [2.80]
CEO Nominating 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.01
[1.31] [1.28] [0.79] [0.75]
(CEO Nominating)*(CFO Board) 0.28* 0.28* 0.02 0.01
[1.90] [1.84] [0.64] [0.45]
CFO Ownership -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.01
[-0.49] [-0.85] [0.75] [0.58]
CFO Tenure (ln) 0.04 0.06 -0.001 -0.001
[0.94] [1.17] [-0.13] [-0.13]
PAFE -0.05 -0.13 0.04 0.02
[-0.48] [-1.23] [1.26] [0.94]
AC Size 0.06 0.01
[1.37] [1.13]
Board Size 0.04* 0.004
[1.95] [1.39]
Insider Ratio -0.01 0.09 -0.07 -0.05
[-0.03] [0.29] [-1.41] [-1.13]
Total Assetst−1 (ln) -0.02** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02***
[-2.47] [-2.71] [-4.48] [-4.27]
Leverage 0.09 0.03 -0.06* -0.06**
[0.39] [0.14] [-1.96] [-1.98]
M/B Ratio 0.02* 0.02* 0.0001 0.0001
[1.87] [1.96] [0.02] [0.15]
Firm Age (ln) -0.10** -0.11** 0.01 0.01
[-2.27] [-2.57] [0.68] [0.75]
INVREC 0.23 0.16 -0.04 -0.04
[0.86] [0.61] [-1.42] [-1.33]
Prop. Loss Years 0.27* 0.28* 0.07*** 0.07***
[1.81] [1.88] [3.03] [2.85]
Std dev(Sales/TA) 0.05 0.05 0.02* 0.01*
[0.72] [0.66] [1.86] [1.85]
Std dev(CF/TA) 0.23 0.23 -0.02 -0.01
[1.24] [1.23] [-0.48] [-0.41]
Adjusted R2 37.31% 37.57% 26.27% 26.52%
Total observations 418 418 334 334
This table presents the regression results on earnings quality. Panel A and B present the results for testing H1b and
H2b, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1. Figures in square brackets are t-statistics. Emboldened figures
indicate statistical significance with *, **, *** for the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively.
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